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Abstract—Key management is an essential cryptographic
primitive upon which other security primitives are built. How-
ever, none of the existing key management schemes are suitable
for ad hoc networks. They are either too inefﬁcient, not functional
on an arbitrary or unknown network topology, or not tolerant
to a changing network topology or link failures. Recent research
on distributed sensor networks suggests that key pre-distribution
schemes (KPS) are the only practical option for scenarios where
the network topology is not known prior to deployment. However,
all of the existing KPS schemes rely on trusted third parties
(TTP) rendering them inapplicable in many ad hoc networking
scenarios and thus restricting them from wide-spread use in ad
hoc networks. To eliminate this reliance on TTP, we introduce
distributed key pre-distribution scheme (DKPS) and construct
the ﬁrst DKPS prototype to realize fully distributed and self-
organized key pre-distribution without relying on any infras-
tructure support. DKPS overcomes the main limitations of the
previous schemes, namely the needs of TTP and an established
routing infrastructure. It minimizes the requirements posed on
the underlying networks and can be easily applied to the ad
hoc networking scenarios where key pre-distribution schemes
were previously inapplicable. Finally, DKPS is robust to changing
topology and broken links and can work before any routing
infrastructure has been established, thus facilitating the wide-
spread deployment of secure ad hoc networks.
Keywords — distributed cryptographic protocol, key pre-
distribution, ad hoc network, cover-free family, probabilistic
method, privacy homomorphism.
I. INTRODUCTION
As mobile ad hoc networks edge closer toward wide-spread
deployment, security issues have became a central concern and
are increasingly important. In fact, ad hoc networks cannot be
used in practice if they are not secure, for example, in appli-
cations like emergency rescue and battleﬁeld communication;
if no security mechanism is used, an adversary can easily
thwart the network establishment. Due to their inefﬁciency,
asymmetric/public key cryptosystems, for example RSA, are
unsuitable for ad hoc networks where there are constraints on
computation and energy [10]. In fact, symmetric key systems,
like DES, AES and keyed hash functions, are still the major
tools for communication privacy and data authenticity in most
networks. To provide secure communication for any group of
nodes using symmetric key cryptography, these nodes need to
share a common secret key1.
Most security requirements, such as privacy, authenticity
and integrity, can be addressed by building upon a solid key
management2 framework. In fact, a secure key management
scheme is the prerequisite for the security of these primitives,
and thus essential to achieving secure infrastructure in ad
hoc networks. However, none of the existing key management
schemes seem to be satisfactory for an ad hoc network due
to the unique properties of the latter. The major limitation of
these schemes is that most of them rely on a trusted third party
(TTP), thus not fulﬁlling the self-organization requirement of
an ad hoc network. In this paper, we present protocols for a
number of parties to jointly generate key distribution patterns,
a process which is usually conducted by TTP. At the end of
the computation, each party holds a set of secrets/keys (with
which it can compute a single group key with any group of
other parties in a non-interactive manner) and none of the other
parties know all the keys it holds.
By deﬁnition [30], an ad hoc network is peer-to-peer and
does not rely on any ﬁxed infrastructure; instead, it is self-
creating on the spot and all networking functions (such as
routing, mobility management, etc..) are performed by the
nodes themselves in a self-organized manner. The challenge
of designing key management protocols for ad hoc networks
thus lies in establishing a secure communication infrastructure,
before any routing fabric3 has been established and in the
absence of any trusted authority or ﬁxed server, from a
collection of mobile nodes which share no pre-initialized
secret information and have no prior contact with each other.
In general, there are three classes of key manage-
ment, namely key distribution, key agreement and key pre-
1This common key, a.k.a. private key, is used as one of the inputs to the
encryption (and the corresponding decryption) algorithm. In symmetric-key
system, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption.
2In this paper, when we mention “key management”, we are referring to
“symmetric key management”.
3It is reasonable and necessary to have security infrastructure established
well before any route is set up, otherwise an adversary can inject or modify
any route information during the route establishment process to mislead other
nodes to preclude any routing fabric setup.
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its limitations.
The traditional Internet style key distribution protocols, for
example Kerberos [21], relying on online trusted third parties
(TTP) to distribute session keys to nodes are infeasible for
ad hoc networks because the TTP may be out of reach or
not available to some of the nodes or during certain times
for a number of reasons. These include communication range
limitations, node movements, network dynamics and unknown
network topology prior to deployment. There exist a number of
proposals for ad hoc networks [12], [17], [33] which attempt
to increase the availability of the key distribution service by
replicating the online key server to a subset of nodes arranged
arbitrarily or hierarchically. However, the performances of
these schemes, in terms of efﬁciency and scalability, are
still not satisfactory. Besides, these schemes still need TTP;
compromising the TTP compromises all the keys it issues.
On the other hand, contributory key agreement protocols
[2], [3], [8], [19], [20], [24], in which each node contributes
an input to establish a common secret (which is a function
of all nodes’ inputs) through successive pairwise message
exchanges among the nodes in a secure manner using the
2-party Difﬁe-Hellman exchange [13], are not practical to
ad hoc networks either. These protocols are fully distributed
and self-organized without needing any TTP, but they are not
robust to changing topology or intermittent links commonly
occurring in an ad hoc network. In order to successfully
establish a key, these protocols strictly require the underlying
networks to either support broadcasting or have a relatively
time-invariant topology of certain forms. Usually, all the nodes
need to be online before the key establishment process is
completed; if any node leaves in the midst due to link or
battery outage, no common key would be established and
the remaining nodes need to re-run the process from scratch.
Obviously, these requirements could never be satisﬁed once an
ad hoc network has been deployed. Besides, key agreement is
not computationally efﬁcient. The worst is: to support these
pairwise exchanges or broadcasts in an ad hoc network, a
routing infrastructure usually needs to be established because
it is possible that two nodes may not reach each other and
need the intermediate nodes to relay messages. As mentioned
earlier, we need to establish a secure infrastructure before
any route is set up to avoid disturbances from an adversary.
Hence, the group key agreement approach without further
improvement is not practical for ad hoc networks. On the other
hand, the pairwise key agreement approach is not scalable
due to the need of frequent interactive rekeying despite key
freshness.
A number of recent works demonstrate that the key pre-
distribution scheme (KPS), independently introduced by Blom
[4] and Matsumoto et. al. [23], offers practical and efﬁcient
solutions to the key management problem in a variety of
models including conferencing [6], [25], broadcast/multicast
[9], [16], [18], [22], [26], and sensor networks [11], [15]. In
KPS, an ofﬂine TTP pre-initializes each node in a set S with
some secret information (a set of long-lived keys) with which
any subset of nodes (Si ⊆S ) later on can ﬁnd or compute
non-interactively a common session key which is secret from
a collusion of at most a certain number of nodes outside Si.
Two works on KPS for distributed sensor networks [11], [15]
further suggest that KPS would be the only practical option to
date for key management in networks whose topology is un-
known prior to deployment or changes fast after deployment.
However, their schemes, and in fact all the existing KPS, still
rely on TTP in the initialization phase to pre-load each node
with the long-lived keys and the corresponding key identiﬁers.
Clearly, compromising the TTP compromises the security of
the whole network. This limitation renders them inapplicable
in many ad hoc network scenarios although the TTP is only
needed during the initialization and can be ofﬂine for the rest
of the time.
In an ad hoc network, the nodes or users (sharing no prior
secret information) may just meet and get to know each
other on the spot where there is likely no single proxy or
TTP they all can trust for key pre-distribution. For example,
some cases of emergency rescue, battleﬁeld communication
and conferencing. Since the nodes (at least in these cases)
may have no knowledge about whom they will meet prior to
network deployment, it is not possible for them to contact
the same TTP in advance for ofﬂine initialization. Randomly
selecting a node or a group of nodes online to perform the tasks
of TTP is not feasible either because of increased security
risk — If the chosen node(s) is (are) compromised, all the
subsequent communications will be left unprotected. As a
result, sharing the key pre-distribution task (usually done by
TTP) by all the nodes/users involved, that is, adopting the
notion of distributed trust, seems to be the only plausible
option. Each one is assumed not to fully trust each other for
key pre-distribution; instead, each one contributes equally to
the key pre-initialization process. We will focus on this line of
solutions for the key management problem in ad hoc networks.
In this paper, we introduce a new paradigm called Dis-
tributed Key Pre-distribution Scheme (DKPS) which is a
collection of distributed cryptographic protocols for a number
of nodes sharing no prior secret to jointly realize the key pre-
distribution function without relying on any TTP (but with re-
sults identical to a TTP-based KPS) . The basic idea of DKPS
is that each node individually picks a set of keys from a large
publicly-known key space following some procedure so that at
the end, the key patterns of all the nodes satisfy the following
exclusion property with a high probability: any subset of nodes
can ﬁnd from their key patterns at least one common key not
covered by a collusion of at most a certain number of other
nodes outside the subset. After checking with other nodes in a
secure manner, if a node ﬁnds that its key pattern cannot satisfy
the exclusion property, it will re-select the keys. Since the key
selection process is memoryless, the node will most probably
get a proper key pattern this time. In fact, with properly chosen
parameters, most nodes can get a proper key pattern in the ﬁrst
round. Based on the novel combination of probabilistic method
and privacy homomorphism, we construct a practical scheme
which demonstrates the existence and feasibility of DKPS. To
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No similar scheme of this kind has appeared in the literature
before.
There are three phases in our DKPS scheme, namely
distributed key selection (DKS), secure shared-key discovery
(SSD) and key exclusion property testing (KEPT). In the DKS
phase, each node4, using the procedure from a probabilistic
cover-free family (CFF) construction, randomly picks keys
from a large pre-deﬁned and publicly-known set P to form its
key-ring (Pi ⊂ P). We prove in this paper that with properly
chosen parameters, there is a high probability guaranteeing
that the exclusion property is satisﬁed. The SSD phase is the
most subtle part of our scheme. In the key discovery phase,
each node needs to ﬁnd out with each one of the others which
keys in their key rings are in common but not to leak any
information about the keys that the other side does not have.
We base the SSD protocol on homomorphic encryption and
introduce a new scheme that ﬁts our purpose here. To allow
a node to test whether its set of keys satisfy the exclusion
property, the information about the keys shared with other
nodes is arranged in a data structure called incidence matrix
through which we derive a simple testing algorithm KEPT.
The major contribution of this paper is that the notion of
distributed key pre-distribution scheme (DKPS) is introduced
and the ﬁrst ever practical scheme to realize fully distributed
and self-organized key pre-distribution is constructed, which
overcomes the main limitations of the previous schemes —
the needs of trusted third parties and established routing
infrastructure. Our scheme neither relies on any infrastructure
support nor requires any TTP. It is particularly suitable for use
in ad hoc networks since it minimizes the requirements posed
on the underlying networks and can be readily applied to the
ad hoc network scenarios where key pre-distribution schemes
were previously inapplicable. Furthermore, our scheme is
robust to changing topology and broken links because the
SSD phase can be interrupted or even stopped at any point
of its operation and resume later on without any penalty on
performance. Unlike most key agreement schemes, rekeying
(which is a hassle) is not needed in our scheme when a
member leaves or a set partition occurs. Finally, it can work
well before any routing infrastructure has been established,
thus facilitating the wide-spread deployment of secure ad hoc
networks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, a review of related works is given. In Section III, we
discuss privacy homomorphism and give the construction of a
new scheme (tailored for use in DKPS). Then, we present the
details of the various stages of DKPS in Section IV. Finally,
we discuss some application and performance issues in Section
V and summarize the results in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we ﬁrst review key distribution schemes,
then key agreement schemes, and ﬁnally key pre-distribution
schemes and key management in sensor networks.
4We will use “user” and “node” interchangeably in this paper.
Traditional key distribution protocols rely on infrastructure
with online trusted third parties (TTP). An example of these is
the well-known Kerberos [21] scheme which is widely used on
the Internet. Kerberos is based on the seminal idea of Needham
et. al. [27] in which each user is pre-initialized with a single
key shared with an online server known as the key distribution
center (KDC). When the users want to establish secure com-
munication among themselves, each one of them has to obtain
a new session key, encrypted with his pre-initialized key, from
the KDC. There are also a number of schemes extending this
approach to ad hoc networks [12], [17] by replicating the
KDC in an arbitrary or hierarchical arrangement. The reliance
on online TTP renders these schemes impractical for ad hoc
network key management.
Difﬁe and Hellman [13] presented the ﬁrst key agreement
protocol for 2 parties, which is the well-known Difﬁe-Hellman
key exchange. A number of natural extensions to their scheme
have been proposed for n parties [2], [3], [8], [19], [20],
[24]. All of these schemes are based on successively running
the 2-party Difﬁe-Hellman key exchange on different message
exchange topologies and sequences to achieve a common key.
The earliest generalization attempt was by Ingemarson et.
al. (ING) [19]. This protocol uses a ring topology in which
pieces of key information are passed along the ring and the
minimum number of rounds required is n − 1. Burmester
et. al. introduced the ﬁrst n-party key agreement protocol
(BD) based on a tree [8]. They described protocols based
on star, tree, broadcast and cyclic topologies. McGrew et. al.
[24] used a one-way function tree (OFT), which is a binary
tree, for the exchange of key information. Kim et. al. [20]
investigated a number of different tree structures for group
key agreement which are efﬁcient with respect to a number of
group operations such as member add, member delete, group
merge and group partition. Becker et. al.[3] demonstrated 2
protocols, namely Hypercube and Octopus, which achieve
the lower bounds on the round complexity and the number
of exchanged messages respectively. These key agreement
schemes are fully distributed and do not need any server or
TTP. However, they are still not suitable for ad hoc networks
for a number of reasons:
• An established routing fabric is needed to achieve broad-
casts, which are used in some of the group key agreement
protocols, conﬂicting with our goal to build a secure
infrastructure to protect route establishment.
• Two nodes which need to exchange messages may not
have direct contact with each other in an ad hoc network;
the key agreement process cannot be completed in this
case unless a routing fabric has already been in place.
• Due to node mobility and link outage, an ad hoc network
has a relatively fast changing topology; in some cases,
before any key can be established, the topology may have
already changed completely and a node may lose its link
to a previous neighbor. Whenever there is a membership
change in the midst of a key agreement process, a re-
run (from scratch) is needed for all the nodes. Hence,
completing a successful key establishment may take long.
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[4]. In this scheme each one of the n users receives a set of
secret keys. From his/her secret keys, user i can compute a
common key with any other user, say j. In other words any
two users can compute a common key without interaction. The
scheme is against a collusion of at most w other users. Blundo
et. al. [6] generalized Blom’s scheme to allow any t users
(out of n users) to compute a common key non-interactively.
They also showed that the total size of the secret keys stored
at each user is optimal. Broadcast Encryption by Fiat and
Naor [16] is another model of key pre-distribution. But this
model assumes that a single sender broadcasts to multiple
receivers and the sender knows all the keys of each receiver.
Thus, it is not applicable for our purpose. This scheme is
secure against a collusion of at most r receivers. Naor et.
al. further developed this work using a tree structure for key
allocation in [26] to make the scheme secure against collusion
of any size. This is the Subset Difference method. Applying a
hierarchical tree to Naor’s work [26], Halvey and Shamir [18]
reduced the key storage requirement of each receiver by almost
a square root factor without signiﬁcantly increasing other
parameters (computation complexity and message overhead
are of the same order of magnitude). Blundo et. al. [5] used
information theory to derive the lower bound on the key
storage requirement of each node in KPS under different
models.
Carman et. al. analyzed a wide variety of approaches for
key agreement and key distribution in sensor networks [10].
They analyzed the overhead of these protocols on a variety
of hardware platforms. Perrig et. al. proposed SPINS [29],
a security architecture for sensor networks. In SPINS, each
sensor node shares with a base station a distinct pre-initialized
secret key which is used for encrypting the session keys.
This is identical to Needham’s idea [27] except that the base
station just needs to store a single root key kBS and the secret
key of each node is generated from the node’s identity and
kBS. Eschenauer and Gligor [15] applied probabilistic key pre-
distribution to distributed sensor networks. Chan et. al. [11]
further improved the security of this work [15] by using mul-
tiple paths for Eschenauer’s indirect key establishment. These
two pieces of work also suggested that key pre-distribution
is the only practical option for the key management problem
in scenarios where network topology is not known prior to
deployment, such as sensor networks and ad hoc networks.
Except key agreement protocols, all these existing schemes
rely on a trusted third party to a more or less extent for
distributing keys online or ofﬂine in a centralized manner.
III. PRIVACY HOMOMORPHISM
Privacy Homomorphism (PH), introduced by Rivest et. al.
[31], is an essential element for constructing our secure shared-
key discovery protocol (SSD) in Section IV-B. In this section,
we will discuss what a private homomorphic encryption is
without giving the formal mathematical deﬁnition, and then
the requirements posed by our DKPS construction on the
properties of PH. We will also discuss why the existing PH
schemes are inapplicable for DKPS. Then we present a new
PH scheme — MRS, which is based on a scheme in [31].
Basically, PH is a special class of encryption functions
which allow the encrypted data to be operated on directly
without needing any knowledge of the decryption functions.
For example, suppose EK(·) is a PH encryption function with
key K and DK(·) is the corresponding decryption function.
Then for all K, given the ciphertexts5 of two plaintexts x and
y (i.e. EK(x) and EK(y)), we can easily compute EK(x+y)
(the encrypted ciphertext/value of the sum of x and y) from
EK(x) and EK(y) using a certain algorithm Add(·,·) without
needing to decrypt them ﬁrst. (i.e. We do not need to know
what DK(·) is.) This is an additive PH — the addition of
plaintext data in their encrypted forms giving an encrypted
sum. There is also multiplicative PH, that is, an algorithm
Multi(·,·) exists for EK(·) to ﬁnd E(xy) from E(x) and
E(y) without any knowledge of DK(·). An example is the
well-known RSA.
Regarding to the adversary attacks, our SSD protocol just
needs an encryption scheme secure to ciphertext-only attacks,
that is, it is not possible for an adversary, given only the
ciphertexts, to ﬁnd the corresponding plaintexts or the key.
To ensure security and proper operation, a PH scheme EK(·)
(and the corresponding DK(·)) for use in our SSD protocol
needs to further satisfy the following three properties:
1) [Additive]:G i v e nEK(x) and EK(y), a computa-
tionally efﬁcient algorithm Add(·,·) exists such that
EK(x + y)=Add(EK(x),E K(y)), that is, EK(x+y)
can be found easily without needing to know what x
and y are.
2) [Scalar Multiplicative]:G i v e nEK(x) and t, a com-
putationally efﬁcient algorithm sMulti(·,·) exists such
that EK(t · x)=sMulti(EK(x),t), that is EK(t · x)
can be found easily without needing to know what x is.
3) [Non-trivial Zero Encryption]: Suppose x1 + y1 =0
and x2 + y2 =0(usually in modular arithmetic). If
x1  = x2 and y1  = y2, then
• Add(EK(x1),E K(y1))  = Add(EK(x2),E K(y2)),
• DK(Add(EK(x1),E K(y1)))
= DK(Add(EK(x2),E K(y2))) = 0.
That is, EK(0) should have a number of different possi-
ble representations in the ciphertext domain, depending
on the processing on the encrypted data that results it.
But all of these representations are decrypted back to 0
(The decryption is a many-to-one mapping.).
The ﬁrst two properties are needed to achieve the goal of the
SSD protocol — to allow two users to ﬁnd out common keys
in their key rings but not to leak out to the other side any infor-
mation of the keys outside the common intersection of the two
key rings. In fact, the second property is implicitly included in
the ﬁrst property (that is, once the ﬁrst property is satisﬁed, the
second property is also satisﬁed) because sMulti(EK(x),t)
can be achieved by running Add(·,·) recursively t times on
5Raw data or message is known as plaintext, and encrypted data is known
as ciphertexts.
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t
i=1 x). The last property is
needed to ensure that neither one of the two parties can
use the exchanged messages to mount an exhaustive search
for the keys of the other side. This is to guard against any
compromised node. We will discuss more details in Section
IV-B.
None of the existing schemes can fulﬁll all these require-
ments. Two of the ﬁve schemes proposed in [31] were found
insecure to ciphertext-only attacks by Brickell et. al. [7].
The one that our work (MRS) is based on is one of the
exceptions but it is still vulnerable to a possible attack shortcut.
The other exception is RSA; it is secure to both ciphertext-
only and known-plaintext attacks, but it can only support
multiplications, not additions which are needed for SSD (the
ﬁrst property). There also exist other schemes [1], [7], [28], but
they are either impractical [1], too computationally inefﬁcient
[28], or over-restrictive on the number of additions that can
be done [7]. Regardless of all these, the major problem is
that none of the existing schemes satisfy the last property —
They all encrypt 0 to only one ciphertext representation; some
of them even have a trivial encrypted zero which is publicly
known. All of the existing schemes are inapplicable for the
purpose of SSD. Hence, based on the work of Rivest et. al.
[31], we introduce a new PH scheme which has improved
security to ﬁt the SSD protocol.
A. Original Rivest’s Scheme
The original scheme of Rivest [31] works as follows:
• Let p and q be large primes and n = pq.( p, q)i st h e
secret key and n is publicly known.
• [Encryption] E(p,q)(·):Zn → Zn × Zn.6
E(p,q)(m)=( m mod p, m mod q)
• [Decryption] Reduce the two components mod p and
mod q respectively, then apply the Chinese Remainder
Theorem (CRT) [32].
• [Homomorphism] This is both additive and multiplica-
tive homomorphic. Componentwise addition and multi-
plication (mod n) of the ciphertexts give the encrypted
values of the addition and multiplication of the corre-
sponding plaintexts in Zn. Suppose Ep,q(m1)=( x1,y 1)
and Ep,q(m2)=( x2,y 2), then
– Addition:
Ep,q(m1 + m2)
= Add(Ep,q(m1),E p,q(m2))
=( x1 + x2 mod n, y1 + y2 mod n)
=( ˆ x, ˆ y)
For those who knows the key (p,q), they can
compute
(ˆ x mod p, ˆ y mod q)
=( ( m1 + m2) mod p, (m1 + m2) mod q)
= Ep,q(m1 + m2). 7
6Zn is integer modular n.
7The result follows because n = pq, hence for any integer z,
(z mod n) mod p = z mod p and (z mod n) mod q = z mod q
– Multiplication:
Ep,q(m1m2)
= Multi(Ep,q(m1),E p,q(m2))
=( x1x2 mod n, y1y2 mod n)
=( ˜ x, ˜ y)
For those who knows the key (p,q), they can
compute
(˜ x mod p, ˜ y mod q)
=( m1m2 mod p, m1m2 mod q)
= Ep,q(m1m2).
The security of this scheme is based on the difﬁculty of
factoring composite numbers of large primes (same as RSA).
Since an adversary does not know the factorization of n,h e
cannot use CRT to decrypt the ciphertexts. However, since
both addition and multiplication are supported, there is a
possible shortcut to mount a ciphertext-only attack as follows:
Suppose we have the ciphertext E(m).U s i n gMulti we
can easily ﬁnd E(m2). After that, we keep running Add
recursively until the result is equal to E(m2). Then the
plaintext m is just the resulting number of rounds of Add
needed to achieve E(m2). Luckily, testing for equality is not
always possible in the Rivest’s scheme.
Beside this attack, the encrypted zero in the Rivest’s scheme
has vulnerable representations of the form (ap, bq) where a ∈
[0,q−1] and b ∈ [0,p−1]. When used in SSD, this would help
any dishonest node, after running the SSD with another node,
to determine the factorization of n and hence all the keys of
the other side. The details of this threat are as follows: Suppose
Bob wants to ﬁnd out the common keys with Alice. In SSD,
Alice sends to Bob encrypted pieces of information (about her
keys) through which Bob can combine with his keys to form
a list of encrypted values. This list that usually only Alice
can decrypt contains encrypted zeros at places where Bob and
Alice have a common key. When the SSD protocol is still in
process, Bob would have no knowledge about p or q. However,
after completing the protocol, he knows which of his keys
are in common with Alice’s (the purpose of SSD). Hence, he
knows which one in the encrypted list is an encrypted zero. By
running the Euclidean algorithm [32] on two encrypted zeros
having different representations, he can easily determine p and
q. Bob may have stored all the encrypted pieces from Alice
and use the recovered p and q to decrypt them; hence, Bob
can ﬁnd all the keys of Alice. To handle this attack, a simple
solution is to split the plaintext into pieces and multiply each
one of them with different secret constants.
In the Rivest’s scheme, if m is small, say smaller than p or
q, it would be un-encrypted (trivial encryption). Furthermore,
0 is most likely encrypted to (0,0) if it results from processing
large numbers or a large number of numbers (which is quite
usual in SSD), that is, property (3) would not be satisﬁed.
To ﬁx all these problems, we derive a new PH scheme
called modiﬁed Rivest’s scheme (MRS). In MRS, we split the
plaintext m into l pieces before applying it to the encryption
function to ensure that the vulnerable form of encrypted zeros
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eliminate the notion of Multi(·,·) (which is not needed in
SSD) and the associated attacks. We also multiply these l
pieces with random numbers8 to avoid trivial encryption.
B. Modiﬁed Rivest’s Scheme (MRS)
Given two large primes p and q and n = pq,t h eM R S
encryption is of the form Ep,q,ri,si(·):Zn → (Zn × Zn)l
(where 1 ≤ i ≤ l) and works as follows:
Encryption: To encrypt a message m ∈ Zn, the steps are as
follows:
• Break down m into a number of, say l, arbitrary
pieces/numbers — (m1,m 2,...,m l) in such a way that
m =
l
i=1 mi mod n.
• Randomly choose ri <pand si <q , ∀i ∈ [1,l] (which
are kept secret).
Note that ri’s need to be different to avoid the attack due
to the vulnerable form of encrypted zeros, so do si’s.
• Apply the encryption function.
Ep,q,ri,si(m)=( ( m1r1 mod p, m1s1 mod q),
(m2r2 mod p, m2s2 mod q),
. . .
(mlrl mod p, mlsl mod q))
=( ( x1,y 1),(x2,y 2),...,(xl,y l))
Decryption: Given c =( ( x1,y 1),(x2,y 2),...,(xl,y l)),t h e
decryption steps are as follows:
• Multiply the components by the corresponding r
−1
i and
s
−1
i respectively (in Zp and Zq), i.e.
((x1r
−1
1 mod p, y1s
−1
1 mod q),
(x2r
−1
2 mod p, y2s
−1
2 mod q),
. . .
(xlr
−1
l mod p, yls
−1
l mod q))
• Use Chinese Remainder Theorem to ﬁnd m1,m 2,...,m l
(mod n).
• Sum up mi’s to recover m.
Encrypted Data Processing: Suppose t ∈ Zn is a con-
stant. Let EK(a)=( ( x1,y 1),...,(xl,y l)) and EK(b)=
((u1,v 1),...,(ul,v l)) where K =( p,q,ri,s i),i∈ [1,l]
is the secret key. We can view EK(·) as a l-tuple of 2-
component vectors, then addition and scalar multiplication in
the ciphertext domain are just componentwise vector addition
and scalar multiplication (both in Zn)o ft h el-tuples of vectors,
that is,
• Addition:
EK(a + b) = (((x1 + u1) mod n,(y1 + v1) mod n),...
...,((xl +ul) mod n,(yl +vl) mod n))
• Multiplication:
EK(t · a)=( ( tx1,ty 1),...,(txl,ty l)) (mod n)
8These random numbers can be viewed as part of the secret key.
1) An Example of MRS: Let p =7 , q =1 1 , then n =7 7 .
For simplicity, let l =2 , that is, each plaintext message is split
into 2 smaller pieces. Let r1 = s1 =5 , r2 = s2 =3 .
Suppose there are two plaintext numbers in Z77: a =1 0
and b =7 . It can easily be seen that 7a+b ≡ 0( mod 77) and
14a +2 b ≡ 0( mod 77). The MRS scheme runs as follows.
Encrypting a:
Decompose a into a1 =4and a2 =6 .
E(a) = ((4 × 5 mod 7, 4 × 5 mod 11),
(6 × 3 mod 7, 6 × 3 mod 11))
= ((6,9),(4,7))
Encrypting b:
Decompose b into b1 =3and b2 =4 .
E(b) = ((3 × 5 mod 7, 3 × 5 mod 11),
(4 × 3 mod 7, 4 × 3 mod 11))
= ((1,4),(5,1))
Computing E(7a + b) in Z77:
E(7a + b) = ((7 × 6+1 , 7 × 9+4 ) ,
(7 × 4+5 , 7 × 7 + 1))
= ((43,67),(33,50))
Computing E(14a +2 b) in Z77:
E(14a +2 b) = ((14 × 6+2× 1, 14 × 9+2× 4),
(14 × 4+2× 5, 14 × 7+2× 1))
= ((9,57),(66,23))
For decryption,
r
−1
1 =5 −1 ≡ 3( mod 7),
s
−1
1 =5 −1 ≡ 9( mod 11),
r
−1
2 =3 −1 ≡ 5( mod 7), and
s
−1
2 =3 −1 ≡ 4( mod 11).
For use in the CRT,
11−1 ≡ 2( mod 7) and 7−1 ≡ 8( mod 11).
Decrypting E(7a + b):
Multiplying r
−1
i (mod p) and s
−1
i (mod q),
((43,67),(35,50))
→ ((43 × 3 mod 7,67 × 9 mod 11),
(33 × 5 mod 7,50 × 4 mod 11))
= ((3,9),(4,2))
Using CRT, the two components of 7a + b are:
(3 × 11 × 2+9× 7 × 8) mod 77 = 31, and
(4 × 11 × 2+2× 7 × 8) mod 77 = 46
Hence, 7a + b = (31 + 46) mod 77 = 0
Decrypting E(14a +2 b):
Multiplying r
−1
i (mod p) and s
−1
i (mod q),
((9,57),(66,23))
→ ((9 × 3 mod 7,57 × 9 mod 11),
(66 × 5 mod 7,23 × 4 mod 11))
= ((6,7),(1,4))
Using CRT, the two components of 14a +2 b are:
(6 × 11 × 2+7× 7 × 8) mod 77 = 62, and
(1 × 11 × 2+4× 7 × 8) mod 77 = 15
Hence, 14a +2 b = (62 + 15) mod 77 = 0
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the ciphertexts results in EK(0) which could have different
representations in (mod n), but all these representations are
decrypted back to 0. This is a nice property for the SSD
protocol as one cannot easily guess whether the result of
a computation is the ciphertext of 0. As indicated by this
example, we may just need to set si = ri = ci, ∀i (where ci’s
are distinct randomly picked numbers) to reduce the temporary
key storage requirement by half.
As suggested by this example, l does not need to be very
large; in fact, l =2would be very sufﬁcient. This can be
explained as follows: Excluding (0,0) which is encrypted to
((0,0),(0,0)) by MRS, there are n − 1 possible pairs in Zn
whose sum is 0. Each component of this pair can have q × p
representations in Zn × Zn. As a result, there are (n − 1)n2
possible representations for an encrypted zero if l =2 .T h i s
number is sufﬁciently large for most applications. To mount a
successful encrypted-zero vulnerable-form attack in MRS, an
adversary needs to determine how m is split into mi’s. For
l =2 , an adversary node would only have a probability of 1/n
to guess correctly how m is split; that is reasonably sufﬁcient.
2) Security of MRS: Just like the original Rivest’s scheme,
MRS is secure as long as factoring integer composite of large
primes is difﬁcult. It can be proved that MRS is at least as
secure as the original Rivest’s scheme using simple reduction.
Unlike the original scheme, there is no notion of Multi(·,·) in
MRS, hence MRS is completely secure to the attack shortcut
mentioned earlier. Testing for encrypted zero in MRS also
seems to be unlikely, rendering it a suitable choice for use in
the SSD protocol. More importantly, it is highly unlikely that
a dishonest node can use the vulnerable form of encrypted
zeros to mount an attack (mentioned earlier), after completing
the SSD protocol with another node, to determine that node’s
SSD encryption keys (p and q) or any element in that node’s
key set it is not supposed to know.
IV. DISTRIBUTED KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION (DKPS)
In this section, we present the details of DKPS including
its three main components, namely distributed key selection
(DKS), secure shared-key discovery (SSD) and key exclusion
property testing (KEPT). Recall that we let each node ran-
domly pick keys into its key ring in the DKS phase, then it
can use the SSD protocol to ﬁnd out which keys it has are in
common with another node, and ﬁnally it can test by looking
at the incidence matrix whether its keys satisfy the exclusion
property. Based on these keys found using DKPS, any group
of nodes can compute non-interactively a group key which is
secure from any collusion of bounded size.
A. Distributed Key Selection (DKS)
In the DKS phase, each node randomly picks keys from the
universal set (which is publicly known) to form its key ring
using a certain procedure to ensure that the exclusion property
is satisﬁed. As the majority of the existing KPS schemes
[4], [6], [9], [16], [22], [25] can be considered as a special
case of the cover-free family (CFF) [14], we will formulate
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
Pk-1
Pk
B={p1,p2,p3, ...., pk-1, pk}
....
B'={p1',p2',p3', ...., pk-1', pk'}
....
P
Fig. 1. DKS based on probabilistic CFF construction
the exclusion property of DKPS using CFF. The generalized
deﬁnition of CFF is as follows:
Deﬁnition 1: Let P be an N-set of points {p1,p 2,...,p N}
and B be a set of subsets (called blocks) of P (i.e. X ⊆
P, ∀X ∈B ). Also let N and T denote |P| and |B| respectively.
Then the set system (P,B) is called a (w,r;d)−CFF(N,T)
(cover-free family) if, for any w blocks X1,...,X w ∈Band
any other r blocks Y1,...,Y r ∈B ,w eh a v e
|(
w
i=1 Xi)\(
r
j=1 Yj)|≥d,
where d is a positive integer.
Although CFF is a widely adopted benchmark for formulat-
ing the security property of key pre-distribution schemes, the
well known constructions (by coding theory or design theory)
are centralized. Since we wish to eliminate the reliance on
TTP, these techniques are not applicable; instead, we use a
probabilistic method to construct CFF in a distributed manner.
By constructing (w,r;1)− CFF over a publicly known
universal key set P, each node or user can pick a block Xi ⊂
P as its key ring. Based on the property of (w,r;1)−CFF,
any subset of nodes with size up to w can ﬁnd at least
one common key from their key rings and any collusion of
nodes outside this subset (with size smaller than r)h a v en o
knowledge about the common key. Ideally, given a group of
nodes of size m, our goal is to construct a (m,r;1)−CFF in
a distributed manner. However, to allow higher tolerance for
key revocation due to some compromised nodes, we usually
construct a (m,r;d) − CFF.
Depicted in Figure 1 shows how two nodes in our proba-
bilistic construction can individually pick keys to form their
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could still be satisﬁed. Suppose we want to construct a
(w,r;d) − CFF assuming the capacity of each node’s key
ring is kB. The detail of the DKS construction is as follows:
Step 1: Select k ≤ kB s.t. d divides k.( k and d could be
hard-coded.)
Step 2: Form the universal key set P with size N = kur
where u = k/d.( P and k are publicly known.9)
Step 3: Divide P into k partitions P1,P 2,...,P k each of
size ur.
Step 4: Each node individually pick keys for his key ring
to form B = {p1,p 2,...,p k} with each pi randomly
selected from the partition Pi,1 ≤ i ≤ k. (Each pi
will follow a uniform distribution over all elements
in Pi.)
Finally, this method yields a (w,r;d) − CFF(N,T) with
the following guarantee:
Theorem 1: The probability that this system is not
(w,r;d) − CFF(N,T) is at most e−t if the following con-
dition on T (the number of users) is satisﬁed:
T ≤ e
2k

2− d
k −e
− d
k(
d
kr)
w−1
2
−t
w+r−1
Proof: For a ﬁxed block B1, we select w−1 other blocks
Bi, 2 ≤ i ≤ w and r other blocks Cj, 1 ≤ j ≤ r. For any
pi ∈ B1,w eh a v e
q = Pr

pi  ∈
w
i=2 Bi\
r
j=1 Cj

=1−
 1
ur
	w−1 
1 − 1
ur
	r
≥ 1 −
 1
ur
	w−1
e− 1
u
Let Xi = δ


pi  ∈
w
i=2 Bi\
r
j=1 Cj

where δ[]is the delta
function, then
Pr{Xi =1 } = q, and Pr{Xi =0 } =1− q.
Let X =
k
i=1 Xi, and apply Chernoff bound to it, we
have
Pr{X>a } = Pr
k
i=1 Xi >a

<e − 2
k(kq+a)
2
Using the bounds obtained above , we have
Pr
 

w
i=1 Bi\
r
j=1 Cj
 
 <d

= Pr[X>k− d]
<e − 2
k(k(1+q)−d)
2
≤ e
−2k

2− d
k−e
− d
k(
d
kr)
w−1
2
There are T possible choices for B1 and
 T−1
w+r−1
	w+r−1
r
	
possible combinations for Bi and Cj (where 2 ≤ i ≤ w, 1 ≤
j ≤ r) leading to a total of T
 T−1
w+r−1
	w+r−1
r
	
<T w+r−1.
9For simplicity, P could just be ZN.
The probability that the system is not (w,r;d) − CFF is
bounded above by:
Tw+r−1 × e
−2k

2− d
k−e
− d
k(
d
kr)
w−1
2
Substituting the statement of the theorem, we can achieve
an upper bound of e−t.
As can be seen, there is a high probability that the exclusion
property of CFF can be satisﬁed if each node follows the
procedure of the DKS scheme presented. If k is reasonably
large and N is properly chosen for a given T, the probability
that the resulting key patterns from the above method is not
CFF could be negligibly small. Most of the nodes would
successfully get a good key set in the ﬁrst round; only a very
small fraction need to run the DKS twice or more.
B. Secure Shared-key Discovery (SSD)
After running the DKS phase, each node has already share
some common keys with another node, but it just does not
know which keys in its key ring are in common with which
node. This is to be done in the shared-key discovery phase.
In an usual KPS with TTP, the TTP gives each node a key
identiﬁer for each key in the latter’s key ring. Since only the
TTP knows the mapping between the keys and the identiﬁers,
each node is restricted to know only the part of the mapping
corresponding to its keys and none of the rest. So the shared-
key discovery in this case is very simple and secure — each
node just broadcasts its key identiﬁers to others; only those
who have the same key know which key a particular identiﬁer
is referring to. For others, they gain no knowledge about the
keys they do not have. This of course cannot be used for
DKPS since each user knows the mapping between the keys
and the identiﬁers in the DKS phase. The challenge here is
how the nodes let each other know which keys they have are
in common without revealing to the others the keys outside the
commonly known fraction. We call it the secure shared key
discovery (SSD) or the secure set intersection computation.
A trivial method for SSD would be as follows: each
node broadcasts a list α,EKi(α),...,E Kk(α) where α is
a challenge and Ki,...,K k are its keys. The decryption of
EKi(α) with a proper key by a received node would reveal
the challenge α and hence discover a shared-key Ki with the
broadcasting node. This method is simple but not secure be-
cause any one of the receivers can mount an exhaustive search
for a particular key. Due to the properties of the distributed
CFF construction in the DKS phase, an eavesdropper can run
the DKS procedure as if he is one of the legitimate nodes to
create a key ring which is likely to have a large overlap with
the key ring of the broadcasting node. The eavesdropper in
this case does not need to run an exhaustive key search over
the entire key space; instead, he just needs to run a key search
over the key ring he creates using the DKS procedure.
Before going into our SSD construction using MRS dis-
cussed in Section III, we would like to give the deﬁnition of
SSD which is as follows:
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is as follows: Two parties, say Alice and Bob, have two sets
A = {a1,a 2,...,a l} and B = {b1,b 2,...,b m} respectively.
Suppose Alice wants to know which elements in her set are
also in Bob’s set, that is, to ﬁnd A ∩ B, but neither Alice
nor Bob wants to let the other know the elements outside
the intersection. They neither want any eavesdropper can
learn about any element in A or B. How can they exchange
messages to ﬁnd A ∩ B securely?
Recall that MRS is an encryption scheme satisfying the
following four properties:
• It is secure to ciphertext-only attacks.
• Given EK(x) and EK(y), it is possible to ﬁnd EK(x+y)
from Ek(x) and EK(y)without needing to know K, x or
y.
• Given EK(x) and a constant t, it is possible to ﬁnd EK(t·
x) without needing to know K or x.
• EK(0) has a large number of different representations
which are non-trivial.
Denote the encryption function of MRS by EK(·) and the
corresponding decryption function by DK(·), then the SSD
protocol built upon MRS is as follows:
[SSD Protocol Using MRS (SSD-MRS) ]
Suppose Alice has the key set A = {a1,a 2,...,a l} and Bob
has the key set B = {b1,b 2,...,b m}. There are two copies
of the following protocol run in parallel — one from Alice to
Bob and the other from Bob to Alice. Shown below is how
Bob can check with Alice which keys he has are in common
with Alice’s. All arithmetics are done in Zn (for some chosen
n = pq by Alice, where p, q are primes).
1) Alice forms a polynomial:
fA(x)= ( x − a1)(x − a2)...(x − al)
= xl + Al−1xl−1 + ...+ A1x + A0
and sends Bob encrypted coefﬁcients of fA(x) (en-
crypted with EKA(·) where KA is Alice’s secret key),
that is, EKA(A0),E KA(A1),...,E KA(Al−1).
Note that if bi is equal to one of the aj’s (1 ≤ j ≤ l),
fA(bi)=0 .
2) Bob sorts bi so that b1 <b 2 <...<b i <...<b m.B o b
chooses a random r. Due to the homomorphic properties
of EKA(·), Bob can compute zi = EKA(rfA(bi)),f o r
1 ≤ i ≤ m. Since EKA(0), the encrypted zero of MRS,
could have several different representations, Bob cannot
mount an exhaustive search as he cannot know what
EKA(0) should look like.
3) Alice, on receiving all these zi’s, applies DKA(·) and
can get rfA(bi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Since Alice has no
knowledge about r, she does not know what bi is. What
she knows is: if bi ∈ A, rfA(bi)=0 .F o rrfA(bi)  =0 ,
since there are u+1unknowns in u non-linear equations
(for some u ≤ m), it would not be possible for Alice to
ﬁnd bi in the information theoretic sense.
4) Alice returns an m-bit bitmap with 1 at bits where
rfA(bi)=0and 0 elsewhere to Bob. A “1” at the i-th
bit indicates to Bob that Alice also has bi.
There is no incentive for Alice to forge a ﬂaw bitmap to
deceive Bob because at the end of SSD, all the keys held by
Bob (even those in the common fraction) will not be revealed
to Alice. If Alice forges a bit corresponding a key that she
does not have, she would be penalized indirectly because Bob
would assume that Alice has that key and may send her a
message encrypted with a session key computed using that
key as a part. (Note that all the common keys in A ∩ B are
involved in computing the session key for Alice and Bob.) In
this way, Alice would not be able to decrypt messages from
Bob. In fact, the other protocol (from Alice to Bob) run in
parallel provides an auxiliary means for Bob to verify any
forged bitmap from Alice.
C. Key Exclusion Property Testing (KEPT)
For a particular node, the pattern about how its keys
are shared with other nodes can be represented in a binary
data structure called incidence matrix. Through its incidence
matrix, each node can test whether all its keys satisfy the
exclusion property of a (w,r;d)−CFF when the information
about the keys shared with other nodes is available. If a node
has k keys in its key ring and there are m other nodes, then
its incidence matrix is an m×k binary matrix A =[ aij] with:
aij =

1, if the j-th key is shared with the i-th node
0, otherwise
The positions of “1” in the i-th row of an incidence matrix
of a node u represent all the keys node u shares with the
i-th node. The positions of “1” in the j-th column represent
all the other nodes sharing the j-th key with node u.T h e
incidence matrix A of a (w,r;d) − CFF is one in which
the vector formed by taking bitwise-AND of any w rows of
A has at least d positions of ‘1’ different from the vector by
taking bitwise-OR of any other r rows in A. A simple and
straightforward algorithm to test the exclusion property is as
follows:
For x =1to w,
For each one of the
m
x
	
x-row-subset,
Compute the bitwise-AND for the x rows, say a.
For each one of the
m−x
r
	
r-row-subset from
the remaining m − x rows,
Compute the bitwise-OR for the r rows, say b.
If the number of “1” in the bitwise-AND of
a and b>k− d,
Fail to satisfy (w,r;d) − CFF and break
Else
Continue
Success to satisfy (w,r;d) − CFF
D. Exchanging Entries of the Incidence Matrices
After two nodes complete running the SSD protocol, they
would know which keys they have are in common. If key j
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j-th column of its incidence matrix. This is possible without
needing to reveal the original key because the list of keys
exchanged in the SSD protocol is sorted. In this way, a node
may collect enough key sharing information of the other nodes
not in contact so that the node may not need to run the
shared-key discovery with these nodes later on. This may
not have signiﬁcant improvement at the initialization phase
where all the nodes have no complete picture of the shared-
key patterns. However, once a group of nodes have completed
the initialization, each one of these nodes would already have
run the SSD with each other; a newly joined node may just
need to run the SSD with a small number of nodes (not
all of the original nodes) to ﬁll up its incidence matrix. In
a (w,r;d) − CFF system, this number might be slightly
larger than r, thus signiﬁcantly improving the latency and
communication complexity of the key management for adding
new nodes.
E. Computing Group Key
After completing the DKPS protocols, each node can ﬁnd
from its key ring a subset of keys in common with any group
of other nodes, through which the nodes can compute a single
group key, and no collusion (≤ a certain size) of nodes outside
the group knows all these common keys. The group key is
thus safe and secret from any collusion with bounded size. An
example of the group key computation for use in DKPS could
be a hash of the concatenation of all the common keys, that is,
the group key Kgroup = h(k1||...||ki||...||kx), where h(·)
is a hash function and all these ki’s belong to the common
intersection of the key rings of all the nodes in the group.
Nobody outside the group would know all these ki’s, and
Kgroup is thus secret and safe.
Like any of the existing key pre-distribution schemes, say
the Blom’s scheme [4], the group key computation in DKPS
can be done at the time of use without needing any further
interaction among the nodes once the key pre-distribution and
shared key discovery have been completed in the initialization
phase. This is a very nice property because any node can com-
pute an encryption key on its own, use it to encrypt messages
and send the encrypted messages to the targeted receivers
using a one-way channel (say broadcast), and each receiver,
by looking at the recipient list of the encrypted message,
can compute the decryption key itself without needing any
further interaction with the sender. This property is particularly
important to the battleﬁeld communication where some of
the nodes need to be in silent mode (only receiving but not
transmitting) to avoid being detected by the enemies.
V. DISCUSSIONS
The motivation of DKPS is to provide key management
to cover some of the previously intractable ad hoc networking
scenarios in which a group of nodes get to know each other on
the spot and do not trust any single node to conduct the key
pre-initialization. DKPS facilitates the notion of distributed
trust and provides completely self-organized key management
solution to ad hoc networks. Ideally, DKPS should be com-
pleted when an ad hoc network is ﬁrst formed. In fact, this can
be achieved in most scenarios in which all the nodes usually
get together for identifying each other and brieﬁng at the time
of network formation; that is also when the nodes establish
initial trust. DKPS can be completed simultaneously during
that time. In fact, this requirement is not strictly necessary for
DKPS as new nodes can be added or the DKPS can be halted
and resume later on after the network is deployed.
The major strength of DKPS is that no trusted third party
is needed and it works without relying on any routing infras-
tructure. When a node ﬁrst join an ad hoc network, it can
just start to pick its keys individually. By running SSD with
its neighbors, the node can immediately establish secure links
with all these neighbors through the common keys discovered
in SSD. Once the SSD phase has been fully completed, the
node can move to anywhere to establish secure links with
its neighbors non-interactively. If node i is compromised, its
neighbors revoke all node i’s keys and can still ﬁnd some
keys in their key rings that node i does not have, and use
them to establish a new key also non-interactively. As long as
the number of compromised nodes is smaller than a certain
threshold r, the network remains in secure communication.
In case the SSD phase has not been completed, when
node i moves into a new area and ﬁnds new neighbors, by
running SSD, he can establish new secure links as before. If
node i meets a previously acquainted node, node i does not
need to run SSD again because it has already known which
keys in its key ring to use for computing the encryption key
non-interactively. Hence, a secure infrastructure can be built
without relying on any established routing infrastructure. In
addition, the performance of DKPS is not affected by topology
or neighborhood changes. Although the DKPS protocol is
supposed to be completed at the start of network deployment,
the SSD protocol can be interrupted in the midst and resume
after deployment.
Comparing with group key agreement schemes, DKPS has
the following differences from it:
• DKPS takes into account all possible subsets of the
current group of nodes whereas key agreement just con-
sider the current group of nodes. Hence, when there
is a member-leave or set partition (which is common
in ad hoc networks), group key agreement needs a
complete re-run whereas the initial secrets distributed
by DKPS can be used to ﬁnd a new key for the new
partition/neighborhood.
• Key agreement needs to be completed at the ﬁrst contact10
whereas some of the nodes in DKPS may escape in the
midst of the computation and do it later without affect-
ing the remaining nodes’ computations. The intermittent
connectivity in ad hoc networks may cause the group key
agreement process to take long to converge.
10Whenever a node disappear in the midst of exchange, all the remaining
nodes need to re-run from scratch.
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topology and sequence of message exchanges. This re-
duce their efﬁciency and increase the number of steps
needed to converge in ad hoc networks which have
arbitrary and usually time-varying topologies. In contrast,
DKPS has no such restriction.
• Compared to the pairwise key agreement approach, the
storage requirement of DKPS is an order of magnitude
smaller. For pairwise key agreement, the number of keys
each node needs is n−1 where n is the total number of
nodes and there are
n
2
	
keys in the network.
Although the SSD protocol uses MRS in this paper, the
SSD protocol is quite ﬂexible and other homomorphic en-
cryption schemes can also be used as long as they satisfy
the requirements posed by SSD. Since the cover-free family
(CFF) construction achieves perfect secrecy, the key storage
requirement at each node may be large. In fact, the probabilis-
tic construction used in this paper is already close to achieving
the lower bound of CFF. To optimize the storage, linking
the keys together using a one-way function is a possible
choice, but this trades off the security from perfect secrecy
to complexity theoretic secrecy.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Key establishment is the bottleneck to providing secure in-
frastructure for ad hoc networks. Key pre-distribution schemes
are believed to be the best option for ad hoc networks, but
all of the existing schemes rely on a trusted third party,
thus limiting its use in ad hoc networks. In this paper, we
demonstrate the feasibility of distributing the task of a trusted
third party to all the nodes through the construction of the ﬁrst
ever DKPS prototype. As future works, we will research for
more efﬁcient constructions of DKS (in terms of key storage)
and SSD (in terms of computational and message overheads).
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